[389-users] Re: docker, 389ds/dirsrv:2.0, vendorVersion 2.1.0, ssca, certificate chain, orphan key, cert9.db, key4.db

Hi David,

forget my statement about the "-J" option, I noticed in your examples
that you actually meant "-F" :-)

Best regards,
  Lutz

Dipl.-Inform. Univ. Lutz Berger
Kettwiger Straße 43
45468 Mülheim an der Ruhr
Telefon: +49 208 88351714
Telefax: +49 208 88351707
Mobil: +49 173 3289783
E-Mail: lutz.berger@multigrid.de
USt-IdNr.: DE280466318

On 18.03.22 22:50, Lutz Berger wrote:

Hi David,

thanks for your input.
There are a couple of versions of "certutil" out there. None of mine support the "-J" option.
I did even look into the source code.

The nature of my question is not about curing the symptoms
by removing the orphaned private key, it's more about removing
the cause, why it gets stored into the databases.

To be more specific here:

When I look into my docker container
with "docker exec -i -t ur1 /bin/bash", I see:

89653e311778:/ # cd /data
89653e311778:/data # ls -l
total 16
...
drwxrwxrwx. 2 root root  156 Mar 16 14:42 ssca
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root   52 Mar 16 12:27 tls
89653e311778:/data #

So, the ssca subdirectory is populated with certificate/key
database related stuff, e.g. noise file, pin file, pwdfile
and self-signed certificate and private key.

But: The ssca is generated after all certificates are
given in the tls directory ( see time stamps of the
subdirectories ).

If you look into the errors log, you'll notice that there is a
mechanism "slapd_extract_cert" that scans for certificates
and keys:

[16/Mar/2022:14:56:10.258591345 +0000] - INFO - slapd_extract_cert - CA CERT NAME: /data/tls/ca/XXXXXXServerCA2015.crt
[16/Mar/2022:14:56:10.259368225 +0000] - INFO - slapd_extract_cert - CA CERT NAME: Self-Signed-CA

At the end of the day everything gets stored into config subdirectory..

I thought, that the "Self-Signed-CA" cert and key should not be
stored into databases at all - because unnecessary when the
tls directory is given, because it contains cert and private key.

So "slapd_extract_cert" should not extract cert/key from "ssca"
if a valid cert/key is given in "tls".

Hopefully my explanation is clear enough.

As William pointed out: Everything works fine... it's more
a side effect for the certificate connoisseur ;-)

Feedback is welcome!

Thanks and best regards,
  Lutz

Dipl.-Inform. Univ. Lutz Berger
Kettwiger Straße 43
45468 Mülheim an der Ruhr
E-Mail: lutz.berger@multigrid.de
USt-IdNr.: DE280466318

On 18.03.22 14:04, David Ritenour wrote:

Hello Lutz and William,    I have used the certutil -J option to remove orphaned private keys from the NSS key database (in this case key3.db).  I always make a tarball backup of the three NSS database files (cert8.db, key3.db, secmod.db) before performing the operation just in case something goes awry.    Example:  #List private keys in NSS keystore  certutil -K -d /etc/dirsrv/slapd-mydir/alias/  certutil: Checking token "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB" in slot "NSS FIPS 140-2 User Private Key Services"  Enter Password or Pin for "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB":  < 0> rsa      ea4730830deb0dd40a7b2f6d4578a28132ae0251   NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB:Server-Cert  < 1> rsa      0c7130b409a03ae2752b0cba6a6dc834d7d5dfb0   (orphan)    #Remove the orphaned key using its keyid  certutil -F -k 0c7130b409a03ae2752b0cba6a6dc834d7d5dfb0 -d /etc/dirsrv/slapd-mydir/alias/  Enter Password or Pin for "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB":    ##List private keys again  certutil -K -d /etc/dirsrv/slapd-mydir/alias/  certutil: Checking token "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB" in slot "NSS FIPS 140-2 User Private Key Services"  Enter Password or Pin for "NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB":  < 0> rsa      ea4730830deb0dd40a7b2f6d4578a28132ae0251   NSS FIPS 140-2 Certificate DB:Server-Cert    Thanks,  Dave    David Ritenour  Senior Directory Engineer  MartinFederal Consulting, LLC  513 Madison Street SE  Huntsville, AL 35801      -----Original Message-----  From: William Brown <william.brown@suse.com>  Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2022 7:02 PM  To: Lutz Berger <lutz.berger@multigrid.de>  Cc: 389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org  Subject: [389-users] Re: docker, 389ds/dirsrv:2.0, vendorVersion 2.1.0, ssca, certificate chain, orphan key, cert9.db, key4.db    ** WARNING: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.      

On 17 Mar 2022, at 20:50, Lutz Berger <lutz.berger@multigrid.de> wrote:      On 16.03.22 23:39, William Brown wrote:  

An orphan key doesn't look nice, but I am more worried about the  unnecessary stuff in the databases    

So the orphan key is the "original" server-cert key that was orphaned since you loaded your own key. It's honestly harmless. Everything else appears to have imported correctly which is excellent!    

OK, agreed. It is harmless, but also not needed. Usually, I choose to use only one private key in my key3.db or key4.db.  My assumption was, that if I provide certificates in the tls  subdirectory, the ssca directory is not even used at all, since the key and cert that are effectively used are stored in the config directory and its databases.  

and the failing openssl certificate validation.    

We'll need to see the output of 'openssl -_client -connect url1.XXXXXX.de:3636 -showcerts' to see what is or isn't self signed in the chain. It could just simply be that your ROOTCA/ServerCA aren't trusted by your openssl install of the host.  

Due to NDA I can't provide more details. But the problem is not  related to self-signed-certs as indicated by openssl's error messages, it's really that I didn't properly specify rootCA/ServerCA.    It works now with:    cat XXXXXXROOTCA2015.crt > ./chain.crt cat XXXXXXServerCA2015.crt >>  ./chain.crt openssl s_client -connect ur1.sedevsso.XXXXXX.de:3636  -CAfile <path>/ca/chain.crt :    ...  ...  SSL handshake has read 4776 bytes and written 427 bytes  ---  New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 Server  public key is 2048 bit Secure Renegotiation IS supported  Compression: NONE  Expansion: NONE  No ALPN negotiated  SSL-Session:      Protocol  : TLSv1.2      Cipher    : ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256      Session-ID: 003BB677D15FC7C0490D3E795F193AB103D1E579D2F554086B63853DA9916525      Session-ID-ctx:      Master-Key: D050F13AD8343F825E4602F57BFFDB7BFBF38438E9ED497C9626F973C7772EC0D52C92B68E4BE087AF49C1DE4C2FB06A      Key-Arg   : None      Krb5 Principal: None      PSK identity: None      PSK identity hint: None      Start Time: 1647338825      Timeout   : 300 (sec)      Verify return code: 0 (ok)  ---  

You should only need ROOTCA for -CA, since the chain will be presented by 389-ds itself as you have the chain on the server. Otherwise yep, sounds like you just need to ensure clients have the ca cert setup correctly.    Happy to help!  

This is to confirm, that    openssl s_client -connect ur1.XXXXXX.XXXXXX.de:3636 -CAfile /root/389ds/tls/ca/XXXXXROOTCA2015.crt    works. So, yes, only the root cert of a chain (and not the whole chain) is needed for server-cert validation done by openssl.      You are the man, William!  Thank you so much.  

You are most welcome :)    

Still, I suggest to remove the ssca stuff, if a customer provides his own cert chain.  Even if everything works properly, I think it's unnecessary to store the ssca cert  and key in the databases. From a troubleshooting perspective it's a bit misleading  in my opinion. Or is there a benefit of keeping it that I do not see?  

It's not that there is a benefit as much as "NSS makes it a complete pain" to remove keys. That's why I never really bothered to actually do it in these cases when we are loading in the data from PEM's :(      --  Sincerely,    William Brown    Senior Software Engineer,  Identity and Access Management  SUSE Labs, Australia  _______________________________________________  389-users mailing list -- 389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org  To unsubscribe send an email to 389-users-leave@lists.fedoraproject.org  Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/  List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines  List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org  Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure  This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which they are addressed. If you are not the intended recipient or the person responsible for delivering the email to the intended recipient, be advised that you have received this email and any such files in error and that any use, dissemination, forwarding, printing or copying of this email and/or any such files is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email in error please immediately notify hr@martinfed.com - (855) 212-1810 , and destroy the original message and any such files.  _______________________________________________  389-users mailing list -- 389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org  To unsubscribe send an email to 389-users-leave@lists.fedoraproject.org  Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/  List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines  List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/389-users@lists.fedoraproject.org  Do not reply to spam on the list, report it: https://pagure.io/fedora-infrastructure  

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